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Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to better understand the relationship 
between accounting and auditing quality and the perceived level of corruption. 
Design/methodology/approach – This relationship is studied by performing a 
cross-country analysis using public data to measure accounting quality, audit 
quality, and corruption. 
Findings – Consistent with our predictions, we find evidence that accounting and 
auditing quality are significantly related to the level of perceived corruption in a 
country. 
Research Limitations/implications –These findings suggest that countries with 
more transparent reporting have lower levels of perceived corruption and that the 
level of perceived corruption may be reduced in a country by improving accounting 
and auditing quality. 
Practical implications – The findings suggest that countries can reduce the level of 
perceived corruption by improving the transparency of financial reporting by 
improving accounting and auditing standards. 
Originality/value – While significant amounts of research has examined perceived 
corruption, this study is the first to address the impact of high quality accounting 
information on the level of perceived corruption.  
Keywords Corporate Governance, Comparative Accounting Systems and Practice, 
Auditing, International Regulations, Corruption, Business/Government interaction 
and relations; 




Word count 8,954                                                                                                             To appear in Journal of Money Laundering Control 
Author’s pre-publication proof                                                                                         (DOI no: 10.1108/13685201011083885) 
1. Introduction 
Organizations are portrayed financially through audited accounting information. The 
purpose of this information is to stakeholders about the financial status of the organization, allowing 
them to make informed decisions regarding the organization. Poor auditing and accounting1 
standards create a situation where there is a lack of accountability to stakeholders, where managers 
can act in a way that is contrary to the expectations of stakeholders without consequence, and where 
assets can be misused and misallocated (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 Auditing and accounting standards seek to make financial information transparent, 
mitigating the risk that those with economic power act in ways that are unethical, illegal, or 
inappropriate. In short, one goal of accounting and auditing standards are to make it more difficult 
for managers of organizations to act contrary to the expectations of shareholders.  When good 
accounting standards exist, organizations are required to disclose information in ways that create 
transparent, accurate, and comparable financial information. As organizations are held to higher 
accounting and auditing standards, management and others within the organization are forced to be 
more transparent about the use of the organization’s assets, making corrupt practices by 
management and others more difficult to commit and conceal.  Indeed, as Hall and Yago (2000: 2) 
indicate, “A key reason for keeping transactions secret is to conceal corrupt practices. With 
transparency comes prying eyes.”   
 Corruption has been defined as “an exchange between two parties… which (i) has an 
influence on the allocation of resources either immediately or in the future; and (ii) involves the use 
or abuse of public or collective responsibility for private ends (Macrae, 1982:678).”  This definition 
is broad enough to include both political corruption, where one of the parties is a public official and 
uses his or her office for private gain, as well as economic corruption, where one of the parties uses 
economic power derived from his or her firm for private gain. By definition, corruption requires 
illegal practices and often has to do with illegal cash payments, misallocation of assets, and other 
inappropriate economically driven transactions (Husted, 1999; Treisman, 2000).  Accounting seeks 
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to make the economic transactions of an organization transparent.  The role of auditing is to provide 
third party assurance of that transparency. In other words, accounting information is a vehicle 
through which private companies demonstrate that they operate legally (i.e. that they do not 
participate in rent-seeking behavior), and public institutions and their managers are held 
accountable to the public.  
In this paper, we perform a cross-country analysis using data from different countries to 
empirically investigate the relationship between accounting and corruption. We do not attempt to 
build a model that explains corruption—such models are plentiful in the literature and, given the 
complexity of corruption, vary widely (for a review - Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2001, Aidt, 2003). 
Rather, we investigate and provide evidence on the relationship between corruption and the quality 
of accounting and auditing present in a country. Specifically, we investigate the relationship 
between two measures of accounting quality and corruption and find that for these measures a 
relationship exists. We then construct a model for corruption using measures of accounting and 
auditing and a proxy for economic development, and find that two measures of accounting are 
significant in explaining corruption when controlling for economic development. To further test the 
relationship between corruption and accounting, we replicate two corruption models existent in the 
literature (DiRienzo et al., 2007; Treisman 2000), and find that adding proxies for accounting 
quality provide additional power in explaining corruption. This is an important discovery because 
if, as our research suggests, better accounting and auditing systems are associated with less 
perceived corruption, then governments may be able to decrease corruption by improving 
accounting and auditing standards- thus improving their business climate, encouraging investments 
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2. Literature Review 
 Corruption has been described as a serious global problem that affects countries throughout 
the world (Transparency International, 2007).   Furthermore, corruption reduces foreign direct 
investment and economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000; Gupta et al., 2002), lowers investment 
in education and health (Mauro, 1997), and puts less corrupt countries at a disadvantage when 
seeking international contracts (Kantor, 1996).Corruption also increases and distorts public 
investment and decreases public expenditures for operation and maintenance of investments (Tanzi 
and Davoodi, 1997). Further, corruption reduces revenue generated through taxation, contributing 
to the inability of some governments to function properly (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). Corruption 
has been credited with eroding trust in the political system and reducing interpersonal trust in 
society (Seligson, 2002). A specific example of the costs of corruption is provided by Hu (2001), 
who estimates the economic cost of corruption to the Chinese economy between 1995 and 1998 to 
be between 13.2 and 16.8 percent of China’s GDP. It is clear that corruption is a serious problem to 
international business, and that an understanding of the contributors (and the possible solutions) of 
corruption are essential. 
While corruption has long been a problem, corruption has only recently been the topic of 
much academic research. Initially, most of the corruption literature was theoretical in nature.  Two 
of these dominant theories include “public choice” (Rose-Ackerman, 1978) and “game theory” 
(Macrae, 1982). Theoretical scholars have suggested that there are three central elements to 
corruption (Jain, 2001). Jain explains these three elements as the follows: 
“First, someone must have discretionary power…Second, there must be economic 
 rents associated with this power…And third, the legal/judicial system must offer 
 sufficiently low probability of detection and/or penalty for the wrongdoing (Jain,  2001: 
 77)”.  
 
Since these three factors provide a basis for how corruption occurs, analyzing these three 
elements can prove helpful when developing strategies to combat corruption. Furthermore, as Jain 
(2001) indicates, these three elements of corruption can be broken into two parts – the first two 
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requirements serve as incentives for corruption and the third requirement acts as a deterrent of 
corruption. The focus of this paper is on the third element of corruption – the detection of 
wrongdoing. If an effective accounting system is in place, the likelihood that someone can engage 
in corrupt acts without being discovered decreases. As a result, Jain’s “probability of detection” is 
increased, the misallocation of assets is more readily brought to light, and less corruption should be 
the result.  As accounting and auditing standards rise, and especially as audits become more 
mandatory, more frequent, and more independent, countries should experience less corruption.  
Over the last 30 years, our overall knowledge of corruption has increased substantially. 
Along with theoretical work, various case studies and empirical work has suggested possible 
explanations of corruption within specific countries (Bunker and Cohen, 1983; Levin and Satarov, 
2000). Unfortunately, however, past research on corruption provided mixed results regarding the 
degree of damage that corruption has upon society. It was uncertain whether corruption actually 
“greased the wheels” of economic transactions, providing economic growth in countries or if 
corruption was detrimental to society and limited economic growth. Theoretically, supporters of the 
“greasing the wheel” argument had a compelling story—corruption facilitated economic 
transactions and was a seemingly efficient way to allocate political goods (Leff, 1964; Beck and 
Maher, 1986). However, research provided by Mauro (1995) countered this argument by providing 
strong empirical evidence suggesting detrimental effects of corruption on society. Today, there is 
general consensus that corruption negatively effects organizations, economies, and society (Wei, 
2000; Pierre-Guillaume and Sekkat, 2005). 
 While initial research on corruption attempted to determine the impact of corruption on 
society, more recent research is examining the causes of corruption. By understanding the 
determinants of corruption, society can better understand how to combat and deter corruption. 
Recent research has provided evidence that many factors influence levels of corruption, including 
the level of Protestantism, a history of British rule, level of economic development, level of 
imports, use of a federal system of government (Treisman, 2000), accessibility of information 
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(DiRienzo et al., 2007), inequality of income distribution and government size (Husted, 1999), 
Hofstede’s cultural values (Husted, 1999; Davis and Ruhe, 2003; DiRienzo,et al,. 2007;), economic 
freedom (Goel and Nelson, 2005), and competition (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Svensson, 2005). 
Indeed, many variables have been shown to influence the level of corruption.  
In addition to recent research on corruption, there has also been a great deal of literature on 
the value of effective accounting and auditing. Research has suggested that the quality of 
accounting information is so important to organizations that they are actually willing to pay a 
premium for what the market perceives as high quality accounting and auditing services. For 
example, Beatty (1989) suggests that investors are willing to pay much higher prices, yielding much 
lower returns, for stock in IPO companies that are audited by audit firms with good reputations. 
Other research, such as the Big Four audit premium literature, demonstrates that markets around the 
world value the quality of information provided by Big Four auditing companies so much that they 
are actually willing to pay premium pricing for their services. Choi et al. (2008), McMeeking et al. 
(2003), Francis (1984), Firth (1985), and DeFond et al. (2000) show a Big Four audit premium in 
the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Hong Kong, respectively. 
 While there exists much literature on both corruption and the value of quality accounting 
and auditing, there is less empirical research to suggest a relationship between the two. While Hall 
and Yago (2000) use a contrived measure of earnings opacity that is driven by both accounting and 
corruption, they provide no significant conclusive evidence to empirically link accounting and 
corruption. Furthermore, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) suggested a link between auditing and 
wages with corruption and prices, however their study was limited only to one country – Argentina. 
Kimbro (2002) performs a cross-country analysis of corruption and finds a relationship between the 
number of accountants per capita and the level of corruption.  As a result there is little cross-country 
research that establishes a direct empirical link between accounting and corruption.  
 While empirical evidence that examines the relationship between accounting and corruption 
is scarce, there are various references to such a relationship within the literature. For example, Alam 
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(1995: 430) lists “managerial and accounting skills” as possible correlates to corruption. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993: 604) indicate that, “the first step to reduce corruption should be to create an 
accounting system that prevents theft from the government.”  Speaking of corruption in China, Sun 
(1999: 6) suggests that accounting practices have already served to lower corruption within China 
and that “accounting reviews and inspection campaigns have served to uncover more obvious 
violations and deter future ones.”  Kaufmann (1997: 130) states that “training programs in 
investigative journalism, accounting, and auditing” could all be used to fight corruption in the 
international community. Everett et al. (2007: 515) claim “corruption is a problem and accounting 
can aid in its fight”. 
Other research also suggests a link between corruption and accounting. For example, Rose-
Ackerman (1997: 49-50) suggests that “creating structures within the public sector that make 
government actions more transparent” may deter corruption. She specifically suggests “financial 
management systems that audit government accounts and make financial information about the 
government public.”  Further, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997: 8) explain that corruption in governmental 
budgeting is highly likely when “some of the essential controlling or auditing institutions are not 
well developed.”  Likewise, Leiken (1997: 72) indicates that the United States can help control 
corruption in multilateral development banks by demanding that these banks “enforce their own 
rules on effective accounting systems, adequate internal controls, and timely audits.”    
As can be seen, the presence and quality of accounting systems, controls, and audits are 
often mentioned, though not empirically tested, in current corruption literature. Given the 
theoretically appealing link between accounting and corruption, we consider the lack of empirical 
evidence to support an accounting-corruption connection to be a major gap within the existing 
literature, and we seek to establish that link.  
 
3. Variable Descriptions and Hypothesis Development 
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In the following section, we discuss two different proxies that we use to measure 
accounting and auditing quality and our hypothesis related to each.  The first of these two proxies 
we label BIG4, while the second proxy we label as PAQ.  We now discuss these two proxies, which 
are defined in Table 1, panel A.  
(Insert table1 here) 
Our measure of BIG4 is a reflection of the presence of large, international accounting firms 
within a county (i.e. Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, and Deloitte and Touche).   
The auditor quality literature suggests that the market is willing to pay a premium for Big 4 
auditing. This is presumably because with highly reputable auditing, one gets better-audited 
financial statements, resulting in more accurate and predictable information and decreased 
information risk. These factors all result in increases in the prices that investors are willing to pay 
for the stock of a company.  Thus, BIG4 measures the quality of auditing as practiced within a 
country. It does not necessarily measure the accounting or auditing standards of a country, as large 
firms often hold themselves to higher standards than national standards require. As auditing 
becomes more efficient, any inappropriate financial transactions by companies would more likely 
be exposed, increasing the probability that corruption would be detected. This in turn decreases the 
demand for rent-seeking behavior of those entrusted with power. Based upon this logic, we present 
our first hypothesis: 
 
H1:  There is a negative relationship between the increased presence of Big 4 firms and 
perceived level of corruption in countries.  
 
 
 Our measure for PAQ is a reflection of the perceived quality of accounting and auditing 
standards based upon the survey responses of businesspeople within various countries2.  This survey 
is administered annually by the World Economic Forum in their Global Competitiveness Survey, 
where the question is asked: “Financial auditing and reporting standards regarding company 
financial performance in your country are (1 = extremely weak, 7 = extremely strong —the best in 
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the world).”These business people who participate in the survey undoubtedly gain their perception 
of accounting and auditing as they see it practiced in their respective organizations.  Thus, while 
BIG4 is a proxy for quality of auditing in that it measures the percentage of firms audited by large 
accounting firms, PAQ is a more subjective proxy for accounting and auditing quality.  However, as 
with BIG4, we posit that those countries that have a higher perceived level of auditing and 
accounting standards will experience less corrupt behavior by those entrusted with power than 
countries with poorer accounting and auditing standards. Hence, our second hypothesis is:  
H2:  There is a negative relationship between the perceived quality of accounting in a 
country and perceived level of corruption. 
 
 
In order to test our hypotheses it is also necessary to have some viable measure of 
corruption. There have been many different proxies for corruption used in the literature, from the 
number of political figures convicted for abuse of power (Goel and Nelson, 1998), to management 
time with bureaucracy (Kaufmann and Wei, 2000), to a number of survey methods measuring 
corruption within a country. In recent research, the latter form has been the preferred measure, with 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) being one of the more popular. 
While discussed extensively by various researchers (e.g. Treisman, 2000; Goel and Nelson, 2005), 
we offer only a brief explanation of the corruption perception index.  
The CPI is a survey of surveys, taking results from many other surveys and combining them 
to make an index of perceived corruption. It is validated in Wilhelm (2002) and its shortcomings are 
discussed in Kaufmann (1998). Jain (2001) offers a review of corruption in general, and includes 
many of the different ways that corruption has been measured. Perhaps the major difference 
between the CPI and other proxies for corruption is that the CPI is a measure of perceived 
corruption, not a measure of some objective phenomena related to corruption. However, even 
“objective” measures are not always accurately observable, and any objective proxy measures 
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something only related to corruption and not corruption itself. Therefore, we believe the CPI to be 
the best available proxy for corruption.  
 As a first step in testing H1and H2, we examine the correlation between each measure of 
accounting and corruption. We expect a significant correlation between both BIG4 and PAQ with 
perceived corruption. Table 1, panel B shows the correlation coefficients. 
These correlations show support for both H1 and H2. The correlations suggest that higher 
levels of corporate financial disclosure and practiced auditing are negatively correlated with 
corruption.  
 
5. Regression Analysis 
 While correlations are useful in establishing a relationship between accounting and 
corruption, they suggest only an association subject to several reservations. The first of these 
reservations is that there are many other factors (omitted variables) that could be driving the 
relationship seen in the correlations.  For example, wealthier countries (those with higher GDPs) 
may have more resources to combat corruption.  Further, because there are so many more economic 
transactions happening in wealthier countries, corruption would prove costlier if allowed to flourish, 
and there thus may be more incentive to prevent it.  Further, wealthier countries are often more 
politically stable, more democratic and have a more sophisticated political system that prevents 
corruption.  Given this, it might be that many variables, such as country wealth, affect both 
accounting and corruption, and the observed correlation is only showing the relationship between 
the omitted variable.  
To mitigate this problem, we replicate two corruption models existent in the literature, and 
add accounting and auditing variables to test for significance.  To find the two models, we searched 
the literature for corruption models that were: (1) published in top journals, (2) replicable (3) 
performed with publically accessible data and (4) substantially different from each other. Based 
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upon these criteria, we identified two models, provided by DiRienzo et al., (2007) (hereafter, 
DiRienzo), and Treisman (2000), (hereafter Treisman). 
 
Using DiRienzo et al. (2007) Control Variables 
The DiRienzo model for explaining corruption focuses around economic freedom, certain 
cultural factors and access to information.  The research by DiRienzo seeks to demonstrate that 
increased access to digital information (variable DAI) will decrease corruption. The model 
essentially uses all other variables as control variables. While explained fully in DiRienzo (2000), 
we offer a brief explanation of the control variables included in the DiRienzo model.  
First, DiRienzo posits, along with Alam (1995), Rose-Ackerman (1978), and Tanzi (1998), 
that countries with unstable and unwieldy governments are more prone to be corrupt. This is a result 
of less regulation, which brings about the possibility of more corruption. Further, Ades and Di Tella 
(1999) and Treisman (2000) claim that more open economies are less likely to experience 
corruption. These references suggest the need to have a variable to measure the level of economic 
freedom within a country in the model. Given this, DiRienzo controls for Economic Freedom, a 
variable created and published in Gwartney, et al., (2002). Along with supporting economic 
freedom, DiRienzo also uses a proxy for economic development (GDP per capita), which the 
literature also supports as being related to corruption (Husted, 1999). Along with economic freedom 
and development, DiRienzo suggests that corruption is very much a cultural phenomena. Supported 
by Husted (1999), DiRienzo also explains corruption using different cultural phenomena within a 
country by using four of Hofstede’s cultural value indicators: Power Distance, Individualism, 
Masculinity, and Uncertainty avoidance.  
First, corruption has been suggested to be influenced by the level of power distance within a 
country. As power is more unequally distributed, with the persons at the top wielding a more 
disproportionate share of the power, people in the society are less likely to criticize and question 
authority. This makes it easier for persons in authority to abuse their public office for the sake of 
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private gain. Second, the individualism of a society has been negatively linked to corruption 
(Husted, 1999). It is thought that this is the result of society placing a higher value on individual 
achievement and responsibility. In individualist societies, people are accountable for what they do, 
while in more collective societies, individuals are less responsible for their individual actions. 
Third, more masculine societies place a higher value on money and power (Adler, 2002), 
motivating corrupt acts that engender the growth of power and wealth. Lastly, Hofstede’s cultural 
value of uncertainty avoidance is linked to corruption in that people in societies that avoid 
uncertainty are less comfortable in unpredictable situations. This leads to an unwillingness to put 
ones’ self in uncertain situations, such as those caused by challenging and questioning authority. 
The variables used in DiRienzo are further described in Table2. 
(Insert table 2 here) 
Like DiRienzo, we posit that cultural, economic, and information access factors may 
contribute to corruption. However, we also believe that the quality of a country’s accounting and 
auditing influence the level of corruption within a country. To test this, we insert BIG4 and PAQ 
into the DiRienzo regression model and test whether the accounting variables are significant in 
explaining corruption in different countries3while controlling for all the other DiRienzo variables.   
The results of ordinary least squares estimations of these models are displayed in Table3.  We start 
with Model 1, which is the original DiRienzo model (in the DiRienzo paper, it is Model 2).  It 
includes the cultural and economic factors, as well as the variable of most interest in the DiRienzo 
study, a proxy for the access to digital information (DAI).     
Model 1: CPI = β0 - β1PDI + β2IDV + β3MAS + β4UAI + β5EFW + β6GDP + β7DAI + ε 
We obtain substantially similar results to DiRienzo, with any differences being attributable 
to data availability for all countries.  We then estimate the model adding the accounting variables 
together in Model 2, and then adding each of the two accounting variables separately in Models 3 
and 4.     
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Model 2: CPI = β0 -β1PDI +β2IDV + β3MAS + β4UAI + β5EFW + β6GDP + β7DAI + β8PAQ + 
β9BIG4 + ε  
Model 3: CPI = β0 -β1PDI +β2IDV + β3MAS - β4UAI + β5EFW + β6GDP + β7DAI + β8PAQ + ε  
Model 4: CPI = β0 -β1PDI +β2IDV + β3MAS - β4UAI + β5EFW + β6GDP + β7DAI + β9BIG4 + ε  
(Insert table 3 here) 
 
Examining the significance of the accounting variables in Models 2-4, we find that both 
BIG4 and PAQ are significant at the .05 level, supporting H1 and H2.  These results suggest that after 
controlling for several country-specific factors, the quality of accounting information has a 
significant impact on the level of corruption in a country. 
 
Using Treisman (2000) Control Variables 
While DiRienzo offers a model of corruption that allows for significant explanation by 
cultural factors, DiRienzo’s model places little focus on the historical economic and political factors 
that influence corruption. Economic freedom and economic development are very general measures 
and are meant to encompass all economic factors that influence corruption.  However, there are no 
control variables for specific economic and political factors. To ensure that accounting is still 
significant when controlling for a number of specific economic and other variables, we replicate a 
portion of Treisman.  Specifically, we replicate the series of nested regressions found in Treisman’s 
Table 3 (Treisman, 2000: 417).   
This nested regression tests for the influence on corruption of the legal system, colonial 
tradition, religious affiliation, ethno linguistic division, natural resource endowment, economic 
development, federalism, democracy, central government wages, degree of state intervention and 
the frequency of turnover of the government leadership. Treisman accomplishes this by starting out 
with a baseline model for explaining corruption that contains the most exogenous and difficult to 
change variables: the legal system, colonial tradition, religious affiliation, ethno linguistic division 
15 
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and the natural resource endowments. He then includes variables to see if the extra variables add 
additional explanatory power to the model, and whether they are significant. Table 4 describes 
Treisman’s variables.  
(Insert table 4 here) 
To test our hypotheses, while controlling for the variables used in Treisman (2000), we add 
both PAQ and BIG4 into the series of nested regressions, right after the base model, in step 2 of the 
series of regressions. We add the variables at this point to analyze their ability to explain corruption 
at every stage of the nested regression sequence.4 We display our results in a manner similar to 
Treisman’s paper, where we start with a single model, results displayed vertically, and then estimate 
additional models, displaying each model with another column in the table. The results are shown in 
Table 5.  
(Insert table 5 here) 
 From this series of nested regression, we see that for one stage of the series BIG4 remains 
significant, thus providing some evidence to support H1. We also find that at every stage of the 
nested regressions, PAQ remains highly significant, providing strong evidence in favor of H2.   
Further, examining the R-squared statistic, we also find significant reason to believe that adding 
PAQ and BIG4 adds explanatory power to our model. 
 
6. Sensitivity Analysis 
Endogeneity 
While we have demonstrated that accounting and corruption are related when controlling 
for many other factors, the direction of causality is not altogether clear. In other words, we must 
clarify if good accounting and auditing help to prevent and deter corruption, or if high levels of 
corruption create an environment of poor auditing and accounting systems. For example, the main 
asset that good audit firms have is their reputation. As a result, it is possible that as the risk of 
corruption increases good audit firms will be less willing to audit entities in that country, and the 
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perception of accounting will suffer as a result. Further, it is often politicians who create laws and 
organizations that govern accounting standards and enforcement. Since rent-seeking public officials 
have the incentive to allow corruption, they may create a situation in which poor accounting and 
auditing occurs. This problem with endogeneity is a serious concern, and has been listed as an 
inherent limitation in many corruption studies (e.g., Treisman, 2000; Other reference is needed).  
The econometric solution for endogeneity includes finding a suitable instrumental variable—
something that has proved difficult in the area of corruption. As a result of these limitations, many 
corruption studies do not attempt to correct for endogeneity (examples).    
To attempt to correct for endogeneity (econometrics reference), we find several 
instrumental variables and run a two-stage least squares regression, instrumenting for PAQ. This 
means that we use an instrumental variable and all other exogenous variables in the model to 
estimate PAQ, and then use the estimate of PAQ to estimate corruption.5 
No instrument fits each of these requirements perfectly. Indeed, as Treisman (2000) 
suggests, the lack of a suitable instrument is a difficulty faced in the corruption literature.6  
However, to ameliorate the difficulty of a lack of a perfect instrument, we select several different 
reasonable instruments for PAQ, and estimate the model using a two stage approach with each 
instrument.  Table 6describes the different instruments we use in our study.  Any of these variables 
risks being a poor instrument.  However, given that many of them are uncorrelated with each other, 
and they give similar results, even if they were not suitable instruments, their lack of correlation 
would indicate they are not suitable in different ways. The fact that they give somewhat similar 
coefficients for PAQ, lends credibility to their use as suitable instruments. 
(Insert table 6 here) 
 Our instruments for PAQ – Governance Transparency, Disclosure, Auditors per capita, and 
Aggressive – are all highly and significantly correlated with PAQ, as can be seen in Table 7.  
Further, as can be seen in Table 7, many of them are uncorrelated with each other.  In untabulated 
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results, many of these instruments are also uncorrelated with the control variables of each of the two 
models we estimate.   
(Insert table 7 here) 
Using these instruments, we estimate both the DiRienzo model and the Treisman model 
using the two-stage least squares approach, and report the results in Table8. Panel A presents results 
using the DiRienzo control variables, and Panel B presents results from using the Treisman control 
variables. 
(Insert table 8 here) 
We find that when using aggressive, governance transparency and disclosure as 
instruments, PAQ is significant at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively.  We also find that the 
coefficients are all quite similar. Additionally, we find significance at the .10 level using 
governance transparency and auditors per capita using the DiRienzo model. While the results from 
each of the instruments are not the same, there are significant similarities between the estimations 
using different instruments. While our lack of a perfect instrument is a limitation in our study, we 
have provided some evidence for the significance of accounting and auditing standards in 
explaining the level of corruption in a country even when considering endogeneity.   
 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
The purpose of this research is to empirically examine the relationship between accounting 
and corruption. With this aim we perform a cross-country analysis using data from 57 countries to 
investigate the relationship between levels of accounting and auditing quality and perceived 
corruption. Through correlation analysis and regression, while controlling for variables found in 
DiRienzo et al (2007) and Treisman (2000), we find evidence to support the hypothesis that: (H1): 
there is a negative relationship between the increased presence of Big Four firms and perceived 
level of corruption in countries, and (H2): there is a negative relationship between the perceived 
quality of accounting in a country and perceived level of corruption in countries.  Considering the 
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limitations of suitable instruments, we address endogeneity concerns by running a two-stage least 
squares analysis using four different instrumental variables. Results are robust to controlling for 
endogeneity for H2. Through using different models with uncorrelated variables, and through using 
two-stage least squares and a set of instruments, we address the problems of omitted variable bias 
and endogeneity, respectively. These findings strongly supporting our overall hypothesis that better 
accounting and auditing is related to reduced corruption.  
The magnitude of the coefficients related to the PAQ in our models demonstrates that 
perceived accounting quality is not only statistically correlated with perceived corruption, but 
economically significant. Given this, along with our demonstration through two-stage least squares 
regression that better accounting decreases corruption, these finding have significance for countries 
desiring to fight corruption: by improving accounting and auditing quality, countries may be able to 
lower corruption.  
These findings, which show that better auditing and accounting standards are associated 
with corruption, are significant and important. Corruption keeps both countries and organizations 
from progressing. This inability to progress is caused by two factors. First, corruption siphons funds 
away which could be reinvested in the economy to help the economy grow. Resources that are 
misallocated as a result of corruption mean that resources are not effectively invested in productive 
assets, exploration or other ways to improve a standard of living. While other countries are 
increasing their GDP and improving their competitive positions, countries with high corruption are 
continually trailing, just trying to get to where they could have been without the corruption. The 
second damaging effect of corruption is probably even more important. Foreign organizations and 
individuals are reticent to invest in countries when they don’t believe their investments will be safe 
or where they perceive corruption to be high. The negative impact of perceived corruption in 
inhibiting investment in economies is likely more significant than the economic catch-up game 
being played by the economies themselves. The double negatives of decreased investments by 
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foreigners and spinning economic wheels to make up for misallocated resources can be devastating 
to an economy.  
In today’s global environment, economies compete not only against each other but against 
their own previous performance. A growing economy is a healthy economy, and a stale or declining 
economy is not only stagnant but failing.  Countries that desire to develop economically should do 
everything possible to decrease corruption. This paper suggests a relationship between accounting 
and corruption, and thus suggests that countries may be able to decrease corruption by improving 
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Table 1 
 
 Panel A:  Variable Definitions 
Variable Descriptiona Source 
BIG4b Big Four. The percentage of firms audited by Big Four 
accounting firms, BIG4 equals 1 if percentages range between 
0 and 25%, 2 if between 25-50%, 3 if between 50-75%, and 4 
if between 75-100%. 
 
PAQ Perceived Accounting Quality. The survey results of asking 
business people worldwide to evaluate the strength of 
accounting standards using the following scale: “Financial 
auditing and reporting standards regarding company financial 
performance in your country are (1 = extremely weak, 7 = 
extremely strong —the best in the world)”. 
World Economic 
Forum, Executive 
Opinion Survey 2003. 
CPI Corruption perception index for 2003. International 
Transparency (2003) 
 
Panel B:  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Corruption and Test Variables 
 
N. Obs. Mean Std. 
Deviation CPI PAQ BIG4 
CPI 128 4.28 2.30 1   
PAQ 100 4.82 0.96 0.842*** 1  
BIG4 42 3.26 0.96 0.625*** 0.522*** 1 
 
a - Where possible we use the description of the variable offered in the original source of the measure.   
 
b - While we use the term Big4, for some of the years included in this study, there were actually five major 
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Table 2 – Description of Variables used in DiRienzo et al. (2007) 
Variable Description 
PDI Power Distance: One of Hofstede’s Cultural Values outlined in Hofstede (1980, 
2001). Refers to the extent that less powerful members of society accept that 
power is not evenly distributed. In other words, power distance shows how 
followers within a society endorse inequality and power. 
 
IDV Individualism: One of Hofstede’s Cultural Values outlined in Hofstede (1980, 
2001). Refers to the extent that individuals are integrated into groups. On the 
individualist side, ties between individuals are loose. The opposite of 
individualism is collectivism, where people are integrated into strong cohesive 
groups. The word individualism refers to the group – not to the state. 
 
MAS Masculinity: One of Hofstede’s Cultural Values outlined in Hofstede (1980, 
2001). Refers to the distribution of gender roles. The opposite of masculinity is 
femininity. In highly masculine countries women are more assertive and 
competitive, but not as much as men, so that highly masculine countries show a 
gap between men and women’s values.  
 
UAI Uncertainty Avoidance: One of Hofstede’s Cultural Values outlined in 
Hofstede (1980, 2001). Refers to a society’s ability for tolerance of uncertainty 
and ambiguity. In other words, uncertainty avoidance refers to the extent that a 
culture helps its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in 
situations that are uncertain and unstructured.  
 
EFW Economic Freedom: An index published in Gwartney et al., (2002) which takes 
into account factors such as the size of government, legal structure, security of 
property rights, access to sound money, freedom to exchange with foreigners, 
and regulation of credit. 
 
DAI Digital Access Index: This index is represented on a scale of 0 (low access) to 1 
(highest access). The overall country score is based on digital communication 
infrastructure, affordability of digital communication access, digital 
communication knowledge, quality of information communication technology, 
and digital information and communication technology. 
 
GDP Gross Domestic Product:  Gross domestic product is a measure of national 
income and output for a given country’s economy. It is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources.  
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  Table 3 – Regression Results using DiRienzo Model Control Variables 
This table presents findings from regressing CPI (the perceived corruption measure) on two test variables (PAQ and Big4) and 
control variables to examine the relationship between accounting quality and corruption. All variables are defined in either table 1 
or table 2. 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 Coefficient 
Std. 
Error  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error  
    Constant -2.159 1.696  -6.351 2.261 *** -4.695 1.74 ** -3.558 1.901 * 
Test Variables 
    PAQ    0.72 0.352 * 0.778 0.25 ***    
    Big4    0.389 0.168 **    0.42 0.176 ** 
Control Variables-From DiRienzo et al. (2007) 
    PDI -0.012 0.008  -0.012 0.01  -0.003 0.008  -0.018 0.01 * 
    IDV -0.005 0.008  -0.011 0.009  -0.007 0.008  -0.007 0.01  
    MAS -0.016 0.007 ** -0.014 0.007 * -0.013 0.006 ** -0.018 0.007 ** 
    UAI -0.007 0.005  0.000 0.006  -0.004 0.005  -0.002 0.006  
    EFW 0.88 0.22 *** 0.841 0.282 *** 0.566 0.227 ** 1.134 0.256 *** 
    GDP 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000  
    DAI 4.804 1.575 *** 4.569 1.869 ** 4.977 1.462 *** 3.557 1.902 * 
             
N. Obs 57   37   55   37   
F 58.36***   36.36***   60.46***   36.26***   
Adj R-Sq. 0.88   0.90   0.90   0.89   
 
Dependent variable CPI 2003 





Word count 8,954                                                                                                             To appear in Journal of Money Laundering Control 
Author’s pre-publication proof                                                                                         (DOI no: 10.1108/13685201011083885) 
Table 4 – Description of Variables used in Treisman (2000) 
Variable Description Source  
CPI Corruption perception index for 2003. Transparency International  
COMMONLAW Common Law System. Company law or commercial code is 
English Common Law. 
La Porta et al. (1997)  
ETHNOLING Probability that two randomly selected inhabitants will not 
belong to the same ethno linguistic group. 
Mauro (1995)  
FEDERAL Have a federal system of government.  Elzar (1995)  
BRITISH Former British Colony or UK. Greir (1995)  
RESOURCES Fuels, minerals and metals as a share of 1993 merchandise 
exports.  
World Bank World Development Reports 
(1995) 
 
TURNOVER Government Turnover. Average number of government leaders 
per year. (number of government leaders in recent period 
divided by length of period in years); recent period: most 
countries 5 Jan. 1980–Dec. 1993; former USSR 5 Jan. 1991–
1994; post-comm. Europe5Jan. 1990–Dec. 1994. Must be 14 
days to count. Leader is PM in parliamentary system, President 
or head of state in presidential or non-democracy. 




GOVWAGE Average government wage relative to per capita GDP. Shiavo Campo et al. (1997)  
 IMPORTS Imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP, 1994. World Bank and the World Development 
Report. 
 
LOGGDP Log GDP per Capita GDP, 1990.  Penn World Tables 5.6 a.  
NEVERCOLONY Dummy Variable indicating whether the country was ever a 
British Colony. 
Fieldhouse (1982) and Grier (1995).  
PROTESTANT Percentage of Population professing protestant faith.  La Porta et al (1999)  
INTERVENTION Index of degree to which "state interference hinders 
development of business."   
Institute from Management Development.  
DEMOCRACY Democratic in all 46 years between 1950-1995, using 
definition of democracy established by Alvarez et al (1996). 
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Table 5 – Series of Regressions Using Treisman (2000) Control Variables  
 
This table presents results of regressing CPI (a perceived corruption measure) on two test variables (PAQ and Big4) as 
well as control variables to examine the relationship between accounting quality and corruption.  Variables are defined in 
either table 1 or table 4. 
 
 Model 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Common Law System 0.658 -1.446 -0.729 -1.034 -0.916 -1.365 
Former British Colony or UK 0.643 0.197 0.195 0.431 0.435 0.577 
Never a Colony 
-1.258 0.498 0.803** 0.852** 0.884** 0.612 
Percent Protestant 0.042*** 0.008 0.011* 0.009 0.011 0.002 
Ethno linguistic Division 
-0.028*** -0.016 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 -0.008 
Fuel Metal and Mineral Exports 
-0.02** -0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.014 
Big4 
 0.497* 0.189 0.169 0.184 0.239 
PAQ  
 2.619*** 1.47*** 1.449*** 1.265** 2.057*** 
Log GDP per Capita 
  3.837*** 4.141*** 3.963*** 1.902 
Federal 
   -0.561 -0.429 -0.016 
Uninterrupted Democracy 
   0.016 0.116 -0.527 
Imports/GDP (%) 
    0.009 0.002 
State Intervention 
     0.896** 
Government Wage 
     -0.098 
Government Turnover 
     1.012 
Constant 6.00*** -9.041*** -17.707*** -18.725*** -17.425*** -16.515** 
       
Adj. R-squared 0.50 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.879 0.893 
N 72 42 42 42 39 32 
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                              Table6 – Description of Instrumental Variables  




 Average ranking of the way firms in different 
countries disclose a variety of financial issues, 
including R&D, Capital expenditures, 
subsidiaries, segment-product, segment-
geographic and accounting policy.  
 Bushman (2004), 






Aggressiveness Scaled accruals by lagged total assets for each 
firm, determine its median in the cross-section of 
firms per country per year, and then average 
across time to obtain the “earnings 
aggressiveness” variable per country.  
 Bhattacharya (2003)  -0.492*** 
Auditors Per 
Capita 
 The number of auditors per 100,000 population.  Saudagaran and Diga 
(1997), Table 6, page 
51, constructed using 









 Developed in Bushman (2004) using factor 
analysis on many different variables that are 
being used to describe corporate financial 
transparency. “A relative measure of the 
availability of information for outside investors 
to hold officers and directors accountable.” 
(Bushman, et al., 2004: 220) 
 Developed using 
factor analysis in 
Bushman, et al. 
(2004), also referred to 
as Factor 2. 
0.492*** 
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                     Table 7 – Correlations  
This table presents correlations between accounting quality variables, corruption, and proposed instruments.  Instrumental 
variables are defined in table 6, and test variables are defined in table 1. 
 
 CPI PAQ DISC BIG4 Agressiveness Auditorspercap Governance 
CPI 1       
PAQ 0.841*** 1      
DISC 0.619*** 0.717*** 1     
BIG4 0.625*** 0.522*** 0.445*** 1    
Agressiveness -0.494*** -0.492*** 0.308* -0.256 1   
Auditorspercap 0.675*** 0.729*** 0.597*** 0.62*** -0.318* 1  
Governance 0.423*** 0.492*** 0.521*** 0.463*** 0.055 0.371* 1 
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Table 8 – Two Stage Least Squares Using Instrumental Variables 
 
This table presents results of two-stage least squares regressions with CPI (a measure of perceived 
corruption) as the dependent variable and instrumental variables control variables as independent 
variables.  The instrumental variables are Aggressiveness, Governance Transparency, DISC, and 
Auditor Per Capita.  The coefficient for these instruments is indicated next to the PAQ label.  
Control variables come from two separate models (the DiRienzo model and the Triesman model). 
Regression results from the two stage least squares estimation using DiRienzo control variables are 
presented in Panel A, and results using the Triesmann control variables are presented in Panel B.  
 
  Instrument Used in Place of Accounting Perception 
















PAQ -0.152 1.291* 1.109 2.493* 
PDI -0.018 -0.007 -0.009 0.007 
IDV -0.001 -0.018* -0.017* -0.033 
MAS -0.031** -0.012* -0.013* -0.004 
UAI 0.006 0.001 0.000 -0.002 
EFW 2.107** 0.685* 0.761** 0.189 
GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
DAI 1.755 6.359*** 6.157*** 6.187* 
Constant -7.785*** -8.324*** -7.66** -12.177*** 











PAQ 2.246** 2.65*** 2.692* -3.673 
Common Law System -1.498 -0.916 -0.998 1.398 
Former British Colony or UK 0.375 -0.340 -0.306 2.028 
Never a Colony 0.782* 1.079*** 1.06*** 0.097 
Percent Protestant 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.042 
Ethno linguistic Division 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 
Fuel Metal and Mineral Exports 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.027 
Log GDP per Capita 3.311*** 3.304*** 3.312** 8.398 
Federal 
-0.668* -0.400 -0.417 -0.451 
Uninterrupted Democracy 
-0.352 -0.442 -0.490 1.714 
Constant -18.914*** -21.081*** -21.3*** -9.351 
Dependent variable CPI 2003 
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Appendix A.  Countries Used in DiRienzo Model 2 
Countries 
AUSTRALIA INDIA PHILIPPINES 
AUSTRIA IRELAND PORTUGAL 
BELGIUM ISRAEL SINGAPORE 
BRAZIL ITALY SOUTH AFRICA 
CANADA JAPAN SPAIN 
CHILE KOREA, SOUTH SWEDEN 
COLOMBIA LUXEMBOURG SWITZERLAND 
DENMARK MEXICO THAILAND 
FINLAND NETHERLANDS TURKEY 
FRANCE NEW ZEALAND UNITED KINGDOM 
GERMANY NORWAY UNITED STATES 
GREECE PAKISTAN URUGUAY 
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1
 Throughout the paper, we refer to both accounting and auditing quality and  accounting and auditing standards. 
Accounting is the process wherein financial information is summarized and transmitted to the public. Auditing is the 
process wherein accounting information is verified. They are both part of the same process, working together to 
create transparent and accurate financial information. 
2
 Unlike BIG4, PAQ has not been used much in the empirical literature. For two cases in which PAQ has been used 
in the literature, see Cornelius (2005a and 2005b). 
3
 An example of the countries examined is found in Appendix A.  As a result of data availability, our sample size, 
and the resultant number of countries, varied from model to model.  DiRienzo model 2 was one of our more 
restricted samples, and so the countries listed in this Appendix represent the 37 countries used in DiRienzo Model 2. 
4
 One difficulty arises in replicating Treisman with the accounting variables. While BIG4 was actually created back 
in the mid-90s (obviously, at that time it was Big5), and thus fits in the same time frame as the Treisman data, the 
PAQ variable has only been measured since 2002, which places it several years ahead of any of the Treisman 
variables. However, in the original Treisman data, there are variables spanning two decades, so, we feel comfortable 
using the accounting perception variable. 
33 
 
Word count 8,954                                                                                                             To appear in Journal of Money Laundering Control 
Author’s pre-publication proof                                                                                         (DOI no: 10.1108/13685201011083885) 
                                                                                                                                                             
5A suitable instrument must meet several different requirements.  First, it must be highly correlated to the 
independent variable we are instrumenting for, in this case, PAQ.  Second, it must be correlated only with the 
instrumental variable, and only affect the dependant variable through the instrumental variable (something which 
can only really be determined theoretically).  Third, it must be uncorrelated to the error term.  Unfortunately, 
correlations with the error term are not directly observable, as the error term is a function of which controls are 
included in the model.  However, non-correlation with the existing control variables will give us some assurance that 
the instrument is uncorrelated to the unobservable error term.  As a final condition, it must be theoretically 
appealing.  That is, it should make sense that PAQ and the instrument are related  
6
 Treisman (2000: 408) states, in discussing the problem of solving endogeneity, “This, however, requires the 
identification of suitable instruments…. Only in one case — the link between economic development and corruption 
— was I able to find a reasonably convincing instrument to test for the direction of causation. A large question mark, 
therefore, remains over the impact of some of the other key variables.” 
